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Tuesday, July 17, 2007

Russian Army - Overview

Russian Army - Overview

Despite its position as the second service in the armed forces hierarchy, the Ground Forces were the most politically influential Soviet service. Senior Ground Forces officers held all important posts within the Ministry of Defense as well as the General Staff. Even after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power and encouraged the policy of arms control and international co­operation, the dominant role and the overwhelming strength of the military did not significantly change. Although Secretary General Gorbachev himself proclaimed during the 27th Party Congress in 1986 a concept of " reasonable sufficiency", in 1988 the Soviet army still maintained more than 200 divisions and more than 50,000 main battle tanks. In 1989 the Ground Forces had 2 million men, organized into four combat arms and three supporting services.

By 1996 the ground forces included in their armaments some 19,000 main battle tanks, 20,000 artillery pieces, 600 surface-to-surface missiles with nuclear capability, and about 2,600 attack and transport helicopters. At that time the Ground Forces of the Russian Federation were estimated to number approximately 670,000 officers and enlisted personnel. Of that number, about 170,000 were contract volunteer enlistees and warrant officers, and about 210,000 were conscripts. Presumably, the remaining 290,000 were commissioned officers, suggesting that some 43 percent of ground forces personnel were officers. This extraordinarily high percentage reflected both the Soviet and Russian tradition of giving little authority to the enlisted ranks, as well as the vestiges of the much larger military cadre inherited from the Soviet army. Much of this bulge is made up of senior field-grade officers and generals who no longer are needed in a smaller military but who are too young to retire. In the mid-1990s, this situation was one of the most difficult personnel problems facing the ground forces command.

The issue of gradually replacing Russia's ineffectual conscription system with a volunteer force has brought heated discussion in the defense establishment. The semiannual draft, which has set about 200,000 as its regular quota, has been an abysmal failure in the post-Soviet era because of evasion and desertion. During evaluation of an initial, experimental contract plan, in May 1996 Yeltsin unexpectedly proposed the filling of all personnel slots in the armed forces with contract personnel by 2000. In 1996 some units already were more than half staffed by contract personnel, and an estimated 300,000 individuals, about 20 percent of the total nominal active force, were serving under contract. At that time, more than half of new contractees were women.

Military service became particularly unpopular in Russia in the mid-1990s. Under conditions of intense political and social uncertainty, the traditional appeal to Russian patriotism no longer resonated among Russia's youth. The percentage of draft-age youth who entered the armed forces dropped from 32 percent in 1994 to 20 percent in 1995. The Law on Military Service stipulates twenty-one grounds for draft exemption, but in many cases eligible individuals simply refuse to report; in July 1996, a report in the daily Pravda referred to a "daily boycott of the draft." In the first half of 1995, about 3,000 conscripts deserted, and in all of 1995 between 50,000 and 70,000 inductees refused to report. According to a 1996 Russian report, such personnel deficiencies meant that only about ten of Russia's sixty-nine ground forces divisions were prepared for combat.

The two most compelling reasons for the failure of conscription are the unfavorable living conditions and pay of soldiers (less than US$1 per month at 1995 exchange rates) and the well-publicized and extremely unpopular Chechnya operation. The Russian tradition of hazing in the ranks, which became more violent and was much more widely reported in the 1990s, also has contributed to society's antipathy toward military service.

On 07 April 1995 the Duma passed a bill which altered the Law on Military Service in Russia. Changes extended the length of required military service from 18 months to 2 years from 01 October 1995 and act retroactively for those drafted in 1993-1994. Only about 19,000 of the approximately 230,000 troops scheduled for discharge in December 1994 were released on time. The bill also introduced universal conscription of young men graduating from institutes of higher learning.

By 1997 the total strength of the ground forces was at an all time low of 400,000 men and officers. Regulations for conscription provided easy loopholes to escape it to over 70 per cent of the eligible age group. In 1996, only 13 per cent of the eligible age group were conscripted, the majority proving themselves "unfit" to serve and the rest successfully prolonging student deferral, or bribing their way out. The deferment allowed to students also meant that only those with minuscule career chances who serve. As of the late 1990s a quarter of draftees had not completed secondary education, and a fifth had a criminal record.

At the outset of the Chechen campaign in December 1994, the Russian Army had no money and little support. The army had not conducted a regiment or division-scale field training exercise in over two years and most battalions were lucky to conduct field training once a year. Most battalions were manned at 55% or less. The Russian Army invaded Chechnya with a rag-tag collection of various units, without an adequate support base. When the Chechens stood their ground, the state to which the Russian Army had sunk became apparent to the world.

To the extent that the Chechnya conflict of 1994-96 was a fair test of combat capability, Russia's armed forces were far from fighting form, even by their own evaluation. As they received pessimistic assessments of the current and future situation, Russian policy makers faced a complex of other adjustments.

According to the resolutions of the Security Council meeting of 11 August 2000, the major reform measures of the general purpose forces will be accomplished by 2006. By that time these forces will have over 800,000 servicemen, for a total reduction of 400,000 troops [possibly as soon as 2003]. The army would lose 180,000 men.

In November 2002 Russian defense minister Sergei B. Ivanov, outlined a package of military reforms. By 2007 soldiers, paratroopers and marines in the most combat-ready units — 10 divisions, 7 brigades and 13 regiments — would all be professionals. Under earlier plans supported by the uniformed leadership, the transition to a contracted, rather than conscripted force would not begin in earnest until 2011.

Draft Russian Military Doctrine

The draft military doctrine document updates the 1993 doctrine. It outlines the role of the country's authorities in ensuring defence and, if necessary, preparing for and waging war, although it stresses that the Russian military doctrine is strictly defensive. The duties of military and civilian authorities and the armed forces are described for various scenarios from peacetime to total war. There are also descriptions of the environments in which the Russian armed forces might have to operate, both at home and abroad, ranging from civil disorder to local and global conflicts and to international peacekeeping. The draft doctrine lists factors that the Russian Federation perceives as potential threats, both internal and external. It states support for a multipolar world, in preference to a unipolar world dominated by a single superpower that is quick to resort to military force and bypasses the UN and other international security bodies when it feels like it. Russia's commitment to its nuclear deterrent is confirmed, but tempered by a no-first-strike policy and the stated desire for the eventual global abolition of nuclear weapons. The commitment to military reform is emphasized, with continued use of conscription but a gradual shift towards a professional army.

Introduction

The Russian Federation military doctrine (hereinafter "military doctrine") represents a systemized aggregate of fundamental official views (guidelines), concentrated in a single document, on preventing wars and armed conflicts, on the nature and methods of waging them, and on organizing the activities of the state, society and citizens to ensure the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The military doctrine is a document of the transition period, the period of establishment of democratic statehood and of a multistructured economy, of reorganization of the Russian Federation military organization, and of a dynamic transformation of the system of international relations. The provisions of the military doctrine as a component part of the set of regulatory legal, conceptual and political programme documents regulating and organizing military security activities are binding on all bodies of executive authority and management, enterprises, establishments and organizations to which Russian Federation legislation has assigned responsibility, within the scope of their obligations and powers, for organizing and accomplishing military organizational development and performing missions of defence and security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The military doctrine elaborates on the 1993 "Basic Provisions of the Russian Federation Military Doctrine" and, as applied to the military sphere, specifies the guidelines of the Russian Federation National Security Concept. It is based on a comprehensive assessment of the status of the military-political situation; on a strategic forecast of its development; on a scientifically substantiated determination of current and future missions, objective requirements and real capabilities for ensuring the Russian Federation's military security; and on conclusions from a systemic analysis of the content and nature of modern wars and armed conflicts and of the domestic and foreign experience of military organizational development and military art. The Russian Federation military doctrine is strictly defensive, which is predetermined by integrally combining in its content a consistent adherence to peace with firm resolve to defend national interests and guarantee the military security of the Russian Federation and it allies. The structure of the military doctrine includes three interrelated parts: military-political principles, military-strategic principles and military-economic principles of the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. Military-political principles are determined with respect to the other parts of military doctrine. The legal basis of the military doctrine consists of the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation, as well as the Russian Federation's international obligations in military security. The military doctrine is implemented by unified, centralized state and military management and by coordinated activities, within the scope of their competence, of all branches and bodies of state authority, public associations and citizens for accomplishing a set of political-diplomatic, economic, social, information, legal, military and other measures aimed at ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

1. MILITARY-POLITICAL PRINCIPLES

The military-political situation

1.1. The status and prospects for development of the present-day military-political situation are determined by the opposition of two trends: on the one hand, a trend toward establishing a unipolar world based on the domination of one superpower and on the use of military force to resolve key problems of world policy; and on the other hand, a trend toward forming a multipolar world based on the equal rights of peoples and nations, on consideration for and assurance of a balance of the national interests of states, and on implementation of fundamental rules of international law. The Russian Federation proceeds from the assumption that social progress, stability and international security can be ensured only within the framework of a multipolar world, and it will assist in its formation in every way possible. 1.2. Basic features of the military political situation:
  • diminished threat of initiation of world war, including a nuclear war;
  • of machinery for maintaining international peace and security on a global and regional level;
  • and strengthening of regional centres of power;
  • strengthening of national-ethnic and religious extremism;
  • activation of separatism;
  • escalation of local wars and armed conflicts;
  • strengthening of a regional arms race;
  • of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems;
  • of the information war;
  • in scale and deepening of the transnational nature of organized crime, terrorism, and the illegal weapons and drugs trade. 1.3. Basic destabilizing factors of the military-political situation:
  • of extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist, and terrorist movements, organizations and structures;
  • of information and other (including nontraditional) means and technologies for achieving destructive military-political goals;
  • diminished effectiveness of existing machinery for ensuring international security, above all the United Nations and OSCE;
  • the practice of applying military force in circumvention of generally recognized principles and rules of international law without UN Security Council sanction;
  • violation of the system of international treaties and agreements in the arms limitation and disarmament area. Basic threats to military security 1.4. Under present conditions the threat of direct military aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies in traditional forms is being averted by following an active foreign- policy course and by maintaining a sufficient level of Russian military potential, including the potential of nuclear deterrence. Meanwhile, a number of potential (including large-scale) external and internal threats to the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies remain and are strengthening in a number of directions. 1.5. Basic external threats:
  • claims on the Russian Federation;
  • in Russian Federation internal affairs;
  • to ignore (or infringe on) Russian Federation interests in resolving international security problems and to oppose strengthening [of the Russian Federation] as one of the influential centres of a multipolar world;
  • of armed conflicts, above all near borders of the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • creation (build-up) of groupings of troops (forces) leading to a disturbance of the existing balance of forces near borders of the Russian Federation and of its allies and in seas adjoining their territory;
  • of military blocs and alliances to the detriment of military security of the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • of foreign troops (without UN Security Council sanction) to the territory of contiguous states friendly with the Russian Federation;
  • equipment, support and training of armed units and groups on the territory of other states with the goal of redeploying them for operations on the territory of the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • attacks (armed provocations) against Russian Federation military installations located on the territory of foreign states as well as against installations and structures on the Russian Federation State Border and on the borders of its allies;
  • aimed at undermining global and regional stability, including by hindering the operation of Russian state and military command and control systems, systems supporting the functioning and combat stability of strategic nuclear forces, and missile attack warning, ABM defence, and space surveillance systems; [and hindering the operation] of nuclear munitions storage facilities, installations of atomic power engineering and of the atomic and chemical industry, and other potentially dangerous installations;
  • (information-technical, information-psychological etc.) operations hostile toward the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • discrimination against and suppression of rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian Federation citizens in foreign states;
  • terrorism. 1.6. Basic internal threats:
  • at the violent overthrow of the constitutional system;
  • activities of extremist national-ethnic, religious separatist and terrorist movements, organizations and structures aimed at disrupting state unity and territorial integrity and at destabilizing the internal situation in the Russian Federation;
  • planning, preparation and accomplishment of actions to disrupt and disorganize the functioning of bodies of state authority and management, and of attacks on state, national economic, military, life support and information infrastructure installations;
  • equipment, training and functioning of unlawful armed units;
  • proliferation (circulation) on Russian Federation territory of weapons, ammunition, explosives and other means which can be used for carrying out sabotage, terrorist acts, and other unlawful actions;
  • crime, terrorism, smuggling and other unlawful activity on a scale threatening Russian Federation military security. Ensuring military security 1.7. Ensuring the Russian Federation's military security is a most important direction of state activity. The main purpose of ensuring military security is to create favourable external conditions for the existence and progress of the Russian Federation and to prevent military aggression by maintaining the state's military might at a level guaranteeing an adequate response to existing and potential military threats to the national interests and security of the Russian Federation and its allies. The Russian Federation views assurance of its military security within the context of building a democratic state governed by law; carrying out socioeconomic reforms; affirming the principles of equitable partnership, mutual advantage and good-neighbourliness in international relations; consistently forming a general, comprehensive system of international security; and preserving and strengthening universal peace. The Russian Federation:
    from the immutability of the system of generally recognized principles and rules of international law and steadfastly follows provisions of the UN Charter, the 1975 and 1992 Helsinki Agreements, the 1990 Paris Charter, and other international treaties and agreements to which it is a party; not be first to begin military operations against a state (or a group or coalition of states) if it (or its allies) are not subjected to armed aggression; retains nuclear power status for deterring (preventing) aggression against it or its allies; priority importance to strengthening the collective security system within the framework of the Commonwealth of Independent States based on the development and strengthening of the Collective Security Treaty; as partners all states whose policy is not detrimental to its national interests and security and does not contradict the UN Charter; preference to political-diplomatic and other nonmilitary means of preventing, containing and neutralizing military threats within the framework of systems of general and comprehensive collective security at regional levels and at a global level; complies with existing treaties in the arms limitation, reduction and elimination area and assists in implementing them and ensuring the regime specified by them; fulfils its interrelated obligations on strategic offensive arms and ABM defence and, on a bilateral basis with the United States and on a multilateral basis with other nuclear states, is prepared for a further reduction of its nuclear weapons to minimal levels meeting requirements of strategic stability and preservation of the balance of strategic arms as a guarantee against a return to a global confrontation of force and to the arms race, on condition of the adherence to these goals of other states as well, above all the United States, and of the preservation and strengthening of the 1972 ABM Treaty; for making the nonproliferation regime universal, for a halt and comprehensive ban on tests and, as the ultimate goal in the future, for the total elimination of nuclear weapons; in every possible expansion of military confidence-building measures, including a mutual exchange of military information and the coordination of military doctrines, military organizational development plans and measures, and military activities.
    1.8. The Russian Federation's military security is ensured by the sum total of forces, means and resources at its disposal . 1.9. Basic principles for ensuring military security:
  • combination of firm, centralized leadership of the state's military organization with civilian control over its activities;
  • effectiveness of forecasting and timeliness of discovering and classifying military threats, and adequacy of the response to them;
  • sufficiency and rational use of forces, means and resources necessary for ensuring military security;
  • conformity of the level of readiness, training and support of the state's military organization to military security needs;
  • avoidance of detriment to international security and to the national security of other countries. 1.10. Basic tasks for ensuring military security: a) in peacetime:
  • and implementing a unified state policy for military security;
  • and upgrading a system of defence of the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • security and protection of Russian Federation citizens;
  • creating favourable foreign policy conditions;
  • maintaining and strengthening friendly, good-neighbour, partner (allied) relations with neighbouring and other states;
  • (deterring, including through nuclear deterrence) aggression or the threat of aggression on any scale against the Russian Federation and its allies by any state or group of states;
  • (if necessary) Russian Federation political actions by taking appropriate military measures and achieving a naval presence;
  • foreign states' fulfillment of their arms-limitation obligations in the area of arms limitation, preservation [word as received] and elimination, and of strengthening confidence-building measures;
  • supporting and qualitatively improving the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other components of the state military organization, and maintaining their readiness for coordinated actions to prevent, repel and stop external and internal threats;
  • the economic, technological and defence-industrial base; increasing the mobilization readiness of the economy; organizing preparation of bodies of state authority and management, enterprises, establishments, organizations, and the population of the country to perform tasks of ensuring military security and conducting territorial and civil defence;
  • internal political stability and protecting the constitutional system and the integrity and inviolability of Russian Federation territory;
  • Russian Federation installations and structures in the World Ocean, in outer space and on the territory of foreign states, and shipping, fishing and other forms of activity in the contiguous sea zone and distant areas of the World Ocean;
  • securing and defending the Russian Federation State Border, within limits of border territory, airspace and the underwater medium, and the exclusive economic zone and continental shelf and their natural resources;
  • the necessary military infrastructure;
  • and accomplishing society's active support of measures for ensuring military security;
  • readiness for participation and participating in peacekeeping activities. b) during a time of threat and at the beginning of war (armed conflict):
  • a timely declaration of a state of war; introducing martial law or a state of emergency in the country or in individual areas; conducting full or partial strategic deployment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities (or a portion of them); and placing them in readiness to perform missions;
  • the fulfilment of Russian Federation obligations to comply with international treaties on arms limitation, reduction and elimination;
  • actions of bodies of state authority and management, institutions of local government, public organizations and citizens to repel and stop aggression and to achieve the goals of war (or armed conflict);
  • and conducting armed, political-diplomatic, information, economic and other kinds of warfare on a coordinated basis;
  • placing in force regulatory legal instruments of wartime; adopting and implementing decisions for preparing and conducting military operations;
  • placing the economy of the country or of its individual sectors or organizations, and transportation and lines of communication onto a war footing;
  • and accomplishing territorial and civil defence measures;
  • Russian Federation allies and mobilizing their capacities for achieving joint goals in war (or armed conflict);
  • preventing the involvement of other states in the war (or armed conflict) on the side of the aggressor;
  • the capabilities of the United Nations and other international organizations to compel an aggressor to terminate a war (or armed conflict) at the earliest possible stage and to restore international stability, security and peace. 1.11. The qualitative improvement in the means, forms and methods of warfare, the increase in their geographical scope and seriousness of its consequences, extension into new areas of activity, and the possibility of achieving military-political goals by indirect, noncontact actions predetermine the special danger of modern wars to peoples and states and to international stability in the world, and make it vital to take exhaustive steps for their prevention and for peaceful settlement of contradictions at early stages of their appearance and development. Leadership in Ensuring Military Security 1.12. Activity to ensure the Russian Federation's military security is headed by the president of the Russian Federation/Supreme Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces. 1.13. The Russian Federation government directs the activity of subordinate federal executive authorities for ensuring military security, [it directs] their mobilization training, it organizes the equipping of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities of the Russian Federation with arms and with military and special equipment, [it organizes] the provision of materiel, resources and services, and it exercises overall direction over operational preparation of Russian Federation territory in the interests of defence. 1.14. Other federal bodies of state authority as well as bodies of state authority of Russian Federation components and institutions of local government, within the scope of their rights, duties and powers specified by Russian Federation federal legislation, organize and bear total responsibility for the fulfilment of missions assigned to them for ensuring military security. Enterprises, establishments, organizations, public associations and citizens of the Russian Federation participate in ensuring military security. 1.15. Command and control of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities of the Russian Federation is exercised by the heads of corresponding federal executive authorities. 1.16. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defence coordinates the activity of federal executive authorities in matters of defence, the development of concepts of organizational development and evolution of components of the state military organization, and orders for arms and military equipment for them; and it develops a federal state programme of armaments and of the development of military equipment, as well as proposals for the state defence procurements. 1.17. The Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff is the basic entity for operational command and control of the Russian Federation Armed Forces; it coordinates the development of plans for organizational development and employment of components of the state military organization and their operational and mobilization training; it organizes and accomplishes strategic planning for employment of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities, operational preparation of Russian Federation territory in the interests of defence, and coordination in fulfilling tasks of ensuring military security. 1.18. Headquarters of military districts (operational-strategic commands) exercise command and control of cross-service groupings of general-purpose troops (forces) as well as of other troops, military units and entities within established boundaries of responsibility with consideration of a unified system of military-administrative division of Russian Federation territory. 1.19. Appropriate unified military command and control entities are established for command and control of coalition groupings of troops (forces) by a coordinated decision of supreme bodies of state authority of coalition member countries . 1.20. For centralized leadership in ensuring the Russian Federation's military security, there is unified strategic and operational planning of military organizational development and employment of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities in the interests of defence, as well as planning which envisages the development of long-term (10-15 years), medium-term (4-5 years) and short-term (1-2 years) documents based on a specific programme approach. 1.21. The procedure for organizing leadership in ensuring the country's military security in a special period, and the creation and functioning of wartime bodies of state and military command and control are regulated by appropriate legislative and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation. state military organization 1.22. The Russian Federation establishes a state military organization to ensure its military security. The state military organization includes the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities which, in accordance with the Russian Federation Constitution, federal laws and other regulatory legal instruments of the Russian Federation, are intended for performing missions of ensuring military security by military means and methods, and it also [includes] entities for command and control of them. 1.23. The Russian Federation Armed Forces are the nucleus of the state military organization and the foundation for ensuring military security. 1.24. The Russian Federation Armed Forces are equipped with nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation considers nuclear weapons to be an effective factor of deterrence against aggression, [a factor] ensuring the military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, and [a factor] maintaining international stability and peace. The Russian Federation proceeds from the need to possess a nuclear deterrent capable of ensuring, on a guaranteed basis, infliction of intended damage on any aggressor state or coalition of states under any conditions. The Russian Federation will not employ nuclear weapons against states parties to the Treaty on the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons that do not possess nuclear weapons, except in case of an invasion or any other attack on the Russian Federation, its territory, its Armed Forces or other troops, its allies, or on a state with which it has a security obligation, carried out or supported by such a state that does not possess nuclear weapons, together with or in the presence of allied obligations with a state possessing nuclear weapons. The Russian Federation retains for itself the right to use nuclear weapons in response to the use of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction against it and its allies, and in response to wide-scale aggression using conventional weapons in situations critical to the national security of the Russian Federation and its allies.

    Organizational development and training of the state military organization.

    1.25. The main goal of organizational development and training of the state military organization is to ensure guaranteed defence of the national interests and military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. 1.26. Basic principles of organizational development and training of the state military organization:
  • consideration of conclusions from analysis of present and forecast military-political trends;
  • of command and control;
  • one-man command on a legal basis;
  • of the level of combat and mobilization readiness and training of military command and control entities and of troops (forces), of their structure, order of battle and numerical strength of the trained reserve, and of stockpiles of materiel and resources to missions of ensuring military security;
  • of training and education;
  • of general civilian political rights and freedoms and assurance of servicemen's social status and standard of living. Organizational development and training of components of the state military organization - the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities - are accomplished in accordance with legal instruments governing their activity and under coordinated and agreed programmes and plans. 1.27. The main programmes of organizational development and training of the state military organization:
  • and improvement of a unified system of command and control of the military organization;
  • development and improvement of troops (forces) ensuring strategic deterrence (including nuclear);
  • equipment, comprehensive support and training of permanent-combat- readiness formations and units of general-purpose forces for performing deterrence missions and conducting combat operations in local wars and armed conflicts. 1.28. The main directions of organizational development and training of the state military organization:
  • the scope and content of missions of the state military organization and [bringing] the structure, composition and numerical strength of its components into line with real needs for ensuring military security;
  • and improving the qualitative level and effectiveness of the system of state and military command and control;
  • military-economic support;
  • upgrading strategic planning;
  • the effectiveness of systems for personnel training, military education, operational and combat training, servicemen's education, all kinds of support, and military science;
  • upgrading the system of manning (based on a composite contract-draft principle, with a consistent increase in the proportion of servicemen performing contract military service as necessary socioeconomic conditions are created);
  • the effectiveness of the system for maintaining and repairing arms and military equipment;
  • orderliness, law and order, and military discipline;
  • an active state policy for strengthening the prestige of military service and preparing citizens for it;
  • developing international military (military-political) and military- technical cooperation;
  • the regulatory legal base of organizational development, evolution and employment of the military organization and its legal relations with civilian society and the state. 1.29. Radical changes in the military-political situation, in the content of missions, and in conditions for ensuring military security of the Russian Federation determine the basic content of comprehensive military reform - a component part and a priority mission of the present stage of military organizational development. An interrelated, coordinated reform of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other components of the state military organization is carried out within the scope of military reform.

    2. MILITARY-STRATEGIC PRINCIPLES

    Nature of Wars and Armed Conflicts

    2.1. The Russian Federation maintains readiness to wage wars and armed conflicts exclusively to prevent, repel and stop aggression; to protect independence, sovereignty, state and territorial integrity; and to ensure military security of the Russian Federation and its allies. 2.2. The nature of modern wars is determined by their military- political goals, the means of achieving these goals, and the scale of military operations. In accordance with this, a modern war can be as follows:
  • terms of military-political goals - just (for the side subjected to aggression); unjust (for the side which undertook aggression);
  • terms of the means used - nuclear (with use of nuclear and other kinds of weapons of mass destruction); conventional (with use only of conventional weapons);
  • terms of scale - local; regional; global. 2.3. Basic general features of modern war:
  • to all spheres of mankind's vital activities and existence;
  • use of indirect strategic operations (political-diplomatic efforts to prevent wars and armed conflicts; economic sanctions; means of information warfare; sea, air and land blockade of communications routes; show of force etc.);
  • information preparation (information blockade, expansion, aggression) and the confusion of public opinion of certain states and of the world community as a whole;
  • of the system of state and military command and control;
  • blocking (disabling) of command and control and fire control systems;
  • of noncontact and other forms and methods of operations (including nontraditional), and of long-range fire and electronic engagement;
  • use of the newest highly effective systems of arms and military equipment (including those based on new physical principles);
  • consequences of damage (destruction) to power engineering enterprises (above all atomic), of chemical and other dangerous industries, of the infrastructure, of lines of communication and of life support facilities;
  • probability of the involvement of new states, of the escalation of warfare, and of an expansion in the scale and spectrum of means being used;
  • of irregular (including unlawful) armed units along with regular ones. 2.4. A world war can result from an escalation of an armed conflict or of a local or regional war, and from the involvement in them of a considerable number (or the majority) of states from different regions of the world. A conventional world war will be characterized by a high probability of escalating into a nuclear war with the inevitable mass victims and destruction and with disastrous consequences for civilization and for the foundations of mankind's vital activities and existence. In a world war, both nuclear as well as conventional, the sides will set radical military-political goals. It will require total mobilization of all material and spiritual resources of the states involved. The Russian Federation consistently and firmly strives to achieve the creation of an effective system of political-legal, organizational-technical and other international safeguards for preventing a new world war in any of its forms. 2.5. A regional war can be waged with the participation of two or more states (groups of states) of a region by national or coalition armed forces using both conventional as well as nuclear weapons. A regional war can result from an escalation of a local war or armed conflict or it may be preceded by a period of threat. Military operations in a conventional regional war can be characterized by:
  • of the sides' operational-strategic goals;
  • warfare in all spheres;
  • operations of groupings of a coalition makeup;
  • use of variously based precision weapons and of means of electronic warfare and other modern kinds of warfare;
  • destruction of troops (forces), rear and economic installations, and lines of communication throughout the territory of opposing sides;
  • conduct of an air operation, during which strategic missions will be executed that are capable of determining the course and outcome of the war. A conventional regional war, if nuclear states or their allies participate in it, will be characterized by the constant threat of use of nuclear weapons. In a regional war the sides will pursue important military-political goals. It will require total strategic deployment of the armed forces and the economy and a high exertion of spiritual forces of the main states involved. 2.6. The goals of a world (regional) war can be achieved, and their outcome predetermined, within the scope of the initial period. The basic content of the initial period of war will be an intensive armed struggle with the goal of repelling (or stopping) aggression, and also a struggle to seize the strategic initiative, to preserve stable state and military command and control, to achieve superiority in the information sphere, and to win (hold) air superiority. 2.7. A conventional world (regional) war can be protracted . In this case its goal will be achieved in subsequent and concluding periods. 2.8. A local war can be waged by a grouping of troops (forces) deployed in the conflict area, reinforced if necessary by the redeployment of troops, forces and assets from other axes and by a partial strategic deployment. In a local war the sides will pursue limited military-political goals. 2.9. A local war is characterized by:
  • of the sides' limited forces and assets;
  • military operations within the boundaries of opposing states;
  • centre-of-resistance combat operations;
  • acute information opposition. 2.10. An armed conflict can result from attempts to resolve national-ethnic, religious and other nonvital contradictions using means of warfare, as a rule without carrying out a strategic deployment. An armed conflict can arise in the forms of an armed incident, armed action, and other armed clashes on a limited scale. A border conflict is a special form of armed conflict. An armed conflict can be international (with the participation of two or more states) or noninternational and internal (with the conduct of armed opposition within limits of one state's territory). In an armed conflict the sides pursue local military-political goals. 2.11. An armed conflict is characterized by:
  • involvement and vulnerability of the local population;
  • use of irregular units;
  • wide use of sabotage and terrorist actions;
  • blockade and disruption of lines of communication;
  • complexity of morale and the psychological atmosphere among troops;
  • diversion of considerable forces and assets to ensure security of movement routes and of disposition areas and locations of troops (forces);
  • danger of transformation into a local war (international armed conflict) or civil war (internal armed conflict). Provisional unified groupings of troops (forces) (from different departments) and entities for command and control of them may be established for performing missions in an internal armed conflict. Principles of employing the armed forces and other troops 2.12. The Russian Federation considers legitimate the use of the Armed Forces, other troops, military units and entities (of the Armed Forces and other troops) and of all components of the state's military organization, and the use of all forces and assets at its disposal, including nuclear (with consideration of the nature and scale of the military threat) to repel and stop aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies. The Armed Forces and other troops also can be employed for containing and neutralizing anticonstitutional actions and unlawful armed violence that threaten the sovereignty, territorial integrity and state unity of the Russian Federation, and for performing missions in conducting peacekeeping operations in accordance with UN Security Council decisions and international obligations of the Russian Federation. 2.13. The Armed Forces and other troops are employed within the framework of unified strategic planning. 2.14. The goal of employing the Armed Forces and other troops is as follows: in a conventional world (regional) in internal armed conflicts - to defeat and eliminate unlawful armed units and bandit and terrorist groups and organizations, restore law and order, ensure public safety and stability, provide necessary assistance to the population and create conditions for a full-scale settlement based on the Russian Federation's Constitution and Russian Federation legislation in force. 2.15. Basic forms of employing the Armed Forces and other troops: a) strategic operations, operations, and combat operations - in a world war and regional wars; b) operations and combat operations - in local wars and armed conflicts; c) peacekeeping operations. 2.16. The Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation must be ready to repel an attack, inflict damage on the aggressor, and conduct active operations, both defensive as well as offensive, with any variation of the initiation and conduct of wars and armed conflicts and under conditions of massive enemy use of modern and advanced weapons, including weapons of mass destruction in all their varieties. The Russian Federation Armed Forces must be capable, with the peacetime order of battle, of ensuring reliable protection for the country against aerospace attack, the performance, along with other troops, of missions to repel aggression in a local war (armed conflict), and the deployment of a grouping of troops (forces) for performing missions in a regional war. At the same time, the Russian Federation Armed Forces must ensure Russian Federation accomplishment of peacekeeping activities both independently as well as in the makeup of international organizations. In the interests of ensuring national security, the Russian Federation may station limited military contingents (military bases) on a treaty basis in strategically important regions of the world to ensure readiness to perform its obligations, assist in forming and maintaining a stable military-strategic balance of forces, and react adequately to the appearance of crisis situations in their initial stage.

    Missions of the Armed Forces and Other Troops

    2.17. Basic missions for ensuring military security:
  • firm direction of staffs and troops (forces);
  • discovery of a threatening development of the military-political situation and of the preparation of armed attack on the Russian Federation and its allies;
  • the composition, status, combat and mobilization readiness, and training of strategic nuclear forces, of forces and assets supporting their functioning and employment, and of command and control systems at a level guaranteeing infliction of intended damage on an aggressor under any situation conditions;
  • the combat potential, combat and mobilization readiness and training of peacetime general-purpose groupings of troops (forces) at a level ensuring repulse of aggression on a local scale;
  • arms, military (special) equipment and supplies in readiness for combat use;
  • of alert duty (combat patrol duty) missions by dedicated (assigned) troops, forces and assets;
  • complete, quality fulfillment of plans and programs of operational, combat and mobilization training and education of troops (forces);
  • ensure readiness for strategic deployment within the scope of state measures for transferring the country from a peacetime to wartime footing;
  • the State Border;
  • and maintain conditions for security of economic activities of the Russian Federation in the territorial sea and exclusive economic zone as well as in distant areas of the World Ocean;
  • important state installations;
  • prevent and stop sabotage and terrorist acts;
  • prevent emergency situations and mop up in their aftermath;
  • organize civil and territorial defence;
  • for route and facility repair, security and defence and the restoration of lines of communication;
  • for information security. All missions of ensuring military security are performed by the Armed Forces and other troops in a coordinated manner, in close interworking and in accordance with their functions as regulated by Russian legislation in force. 2.18. Basic missions of repelling (stopping) armed attack (aggression) on the Russian Federation and its allies:
  • or total strategic deployment;
  • operations, operations and combat operations (including joint ones with allied states) to rout invaders and destroy groupings of aggressor troops (forces) that have been established (or are being established) in their basing and concentration areas and on lines of communication;
  • readiness for employment and employ the potential of nuclear deterrence (in instances envisaged by military doctrine and according to prescribed procedure
  • and neutralize border armed conflicts;
  • a regime of martial law (state of emergency);
  • the population and installations of the economy and infrastructure against the effect of enemy weapons;
  • allied obligations. The performance of missions to repel (stop) an armed attack (aggression) is organized and accomplished in accordance with the Plan for Employment of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, the Russian Federation Armed Forces Mobilization Plan, Russian Federation presidential edicts, orders and directives of the Supreme Commander of the Russian Federation Armed Forces, and other regulatory legal, planning and directive documents. 2.19. Basic missions in peacekeeping operations:
  • armed groupings of sides in conflict;
  • conditions for delivery of humanitarian aid to the civilian population and for its evacuation from the conflict zone;
  • off the conflict area with the goal of ensuring fulfilment of sanctions adopted by the international community;
  • preconditions for a political settlement. Performance of missions in peacekeeping operations is assigned to the Russian Federation Armed Forces with the involvement of other troops, military units and entities if necessary. Specially assigned formations and units are detailed to prepare for these missions. Along with training for employment for their immediate purpose, they train under a special programme. The Russian Federation provides logistic and technical support, training, preparation, planning and operational command and control of Russian contingents in accordance with standards and procedures of the United Nations, OSCE and CIS. 2.20. Basic missions in internal armed conflicts:
  • and eliminate unlawful armed units, bandit and terrorist groups and organizations, and their bases, training centres, depots and lines of communication;
  • law and order;
  • ensure public safety and stability;
  • maintain a legal regime of a state of emergency in the conflict area;
  • contain and seal off a conflict area;
  • stop armed clashes and separate opposing sides;
  • measures to disarm (confiscate weapons from) the population in a conflict area;
  • reinforce the protection of public order and safety in areas adjoining the conflict area. Performance of missions to avert, stop, localize, and seal off areas of internal armed conflicts and destroy unlawful armed units, bands and terrorist groups is assigned to unified groupings of troops (forces) (from different departments) and entities for their command and control established on a provisional basis. 2.21. Forces and assets of the Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation may be enlisted to assist bodies of state authority, institutions of local government and the population in relief operations following accidents, disasters and natural disasters. 2.22. Groupings of troops (forces) on Russian Federation territory are established to perform missions assigned to the Armed Forces and other troops with consideration of the following:
  • of potential military danger on specific strategic axes;
  • nature of mutual relations of the Russian Federation with contiguous states;
  • of industrial areas, areas of strategic resources and especially important installations vital to the Russian Federation;
  • possibility of strategic deployment on threatened axes with a maximum decrease in volumes of movements, as well as [the possibility] of an interregional manoeuvre;
  • possibility of a timely withdrawal of troops (forces) and logistic and technical support reserves from under probable missile/air strikes;
  • conditions for billeting and support to vital activities of troops and for resolving social and everyday problems;
  • and status of a base for mobilization deployment;
  • status of socio-political situation in specific regions. 2.23. The Armed Forces and other troops of the Russian Federation may be stationed outside its territory as part of joint or Russian groupings and of separate bases (installations). The conditions for such stationing are defined by corresponding international-law documents. 2.24. When composite military units of the Commonwealth of Independent States are established, they are manned by servicemen of member states in accordance with their national legislation and agreements adopted among the states. Servicemen who are Russian Federation citizens are sent to man such units on a contract basis as a rule. Russian Federation Armed Forces units located on the territory of foreign states, regardless of the conditions of stationing, are part of the Russian Federation Armed Forces and act in accordance with the procedure established in them, with consideration of requirements of the UN Charter, UN Security Council resolutions, and bilateral and multilateral treaties of the Russian Federation. 2.25. Operational preparation of the territory of the Russian Federation is accomplished under the direction of the Russian Federation government and on the basis of the Federal State Programme for establishing and developing the state's military infrastructure to support strategic deployment, the conduct of military operations and the manoeuvre of forces and assets by the Russian Federation Armed Forces and other troops, and a timely transfer of the economy from peacetime to wartime in the interests of defence. 2.26. The stockpiling and maintenance of supplies are organized by the Russian Federation government under plans approved by the Russian Federation president for establishing a state reserve and mobilization reserves. In accordance with federal legislation, in peacetime the Russian Federation Armed Forces, other troops, as well as bodies of state management stockpile, echelon, accommodate and maintain supplies supporting mobilization deployment of troops (forces) and their combat operations in the initial period of war (and for a more lengthy period for certain kinds of supplies), and the formation, preparation, redisposition and use of strategic reserves. The Russian Federation Ministry of Defence plans the stockpiling, echelonment and accommodation of operational supplies and their maintenance for troops of other federal executive authorities operationally subordinated in a special period to the Russian Federation Ministry of Defence. 2.27. Planning for training citizens for military service and for accumulating the necessary number of militarily trained resources in reserve, and their registration, are accomplished under the overall direction of the Russian Federation Armed Forces General Staff. 2.28. The population receives purposeful training for territorial and civil defence both in peacetime as well as wartime, and a set of measures is carried out to increase the functioning stability of installations of the economy, transportation and lines of communication and to ensure readiness to conduct emergency rescue and other operations in stricken areas and areas of accidents, disasters and natural disasters.

    3. MILITARY-ECONOMIC PRINCIPLES

    Military-economic support to military security

    3.1. The main goal of military-economic support is financial and material support to the state's military organization and its equipment with effective armament systems, military and special equipment, property, and other materiel resources in quantities necessary for assurance of the Russian Federation's military security. 3.2. Basic missions of military-economic support:
  • objective needs of the state's military organization for financial and materiel resources;
  • and develop a logistic and technical support base of combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops;
  • coordinate military-economic activities and meet needs of the state's military organization for materiel resources;
  • develop the scientific and technical, technological and production base of the state's military organization and of the military infrastructure;
  • and upgrade the system of armaments and of military and special equipment and property, equip the state's military organization with it, and provide for day-to-day maintenance, repair and modernization;
  • a scientific and technical, design and production reserve of achievements for creating a highly effective system of new- generation arms and for the subsequent scheduled re-equipment of the military organization;
  • the level of social support of the state's military organization and the level of everyday material conditions of servicemen's vital activities;
  • ensure the functioning and upgrading of systems for mobilization readiness and mobilization preparation of the economy and population of the country;
  • carry out mutually advantageous international military and military- technical cooperation;
  • international obligations in the military-economic sphere . 3.3. Priority missions of military-economic support:
  • combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces and other troops;
  • a quality upgrade of the strategic arms complex;
  • develop and produce highly effective systems of:
    • command and control,
    • fire control,
    • communications,
    • reconnaissance,
    • strategic warning,
    • electronic warfare,
    • precision, mobile non-nuclear weapons,
    • their information support;
  • standardize and reduce the number of types and nomenclature of arms and military equipment;
  • the standard of living and implement social guarantees prescribed by legislation for servicemen and their families. 3.4. Basic principles of military-economic support:
  • of the level of military-economic support to the needs of military security;
  • and technical, technological, information and resource independence in the development and production of basic kinds of military products;
  • concentration of financial, logistic and intellectual resources on performing key missions of ensuring military security. 3.5. Basic directions of military-economic support:
  • the system of state management of the defence industrial complex;
  • and converting the defence industrial complex (without detriment to the development of new technologies and scientific and technical capabilities);
  • guaranteed financial and logistic resources for the work of creating arms, military and special equipment, and military property, and for the development of technologies for their development and production;
  • introducing a system of economic incentives in state regulation of price formation in the development and production of military and dual-purpose products at enterprises of all forms of ownership;
  • state support of enterprises (industries) and organizations (establishments) that determine the military-technical and technological stability of the defence industrial complex, and of closed administrative-territorial formations and city-forming enterprises;
  • and developing a system of national economic installations necessary for stable functioning of the national economy and for life support of the population in wartime;
  • and creating new mobilization capacities and installations and replenishing state reserves;
  • and conducting basic, exploratory and applied research and advanced scientific and technical and technological developments, including advanced competitive and import-replacing technologies;
  • developing a scientific and technical and experimental base of defence sectors of industry and their scientific research and experimental design establishments and organizations;
  • contractual and competitive principles in the system of orders and of the development and production of military products;
  • international production cooperation and military-technical cooperation in joint research, development, testing and experimental work with foreign countries to increase the Russian Federation's military-economic potential;
  • the export of science-intensive military and civilian products of enterprises of the defence industrial complex;
  • fulfilling international obligations for reducing and limiting armed forces and arms and for maintaining international security and peace;
  • patent and other legal protection for objects of intellectual property contained in military products and in the technologies of their development and production;
  • providing social protection for workers being laid off in connection with restructuring of the defence industrial complex, and keeping highly skilled personnel in the defence sector. 3.6. Basic directions of mobilization preparation of the economy:
  • a system of management of the economy for stable functioning in a period of transition to operation under conditions of wartime and in wartime;
  • upgrading and effective functioning of the system of mobilization preparation of bodies of state authority and management at all levels, and of organizations and enterprises having mobilization assignments;
  • and developing mobilization capacities and facilities;
  • stockpiling, preserving and renewing supplies in mobilization and state reserves;
  • creating and preserving a contingency fund of design and technical documentation for wartime;
  • preparing financial-credit and tax systems and a monetary circulation system for a special regime of functioning under wartime conditions;
  • and upgrading a regulatory legal base of mobilization preparation and transition of the economy of the Russian Federation, components of the Russian Federation and municipal formations from peacetime to wartime. International Military and Military-Technical Cooperation 3.7. The Russian Federation organizes and accomplishes international military (military-political) and military-technical cooperation based on its national interests and the need for a balanced accomplishment of tasks for ensuring military security. International military and military-technical cooperation is the prerogative of the state. 3.8. The Russian Federation accomplishes international military cooperation based on principles of equal rights, mutual advantage and good-neighbourliness and in the interests of international stability and national, regional and global security 3.9. The Russian Federation organizes and accomplishes international military-technical cooperation based on foreign-policy and economic advisability, strictly taking into account the interests of military security of the Russian Federation and its allies, on the basis of strict compliance with laws and other legal norms of the Russian Federation and with its international obligations. 3.10. The Russian Federation attaches priority importance to the development of military and military-technical cooperation with states parties to the CIS Collective Security Treaty, based on the need to consolidate efforts to establish a unified defence space and ensure collective military security. 3.11. Basic directions of international military and military- technical cooperation:
  • the Russian Federation's military-political positions in various regions of the world;
  • currency proceeds for state needs, for development of military production, for conversion, for eliminating and recycling arms and military equipment, and for structural reorganization of enterprises of defence sectors of industry;
  • the country's export potential in the area of conventional arms and military equipment at the necessary level.

    CONCLUSION

    The Russian Federation guarantees the consistent, firm fulfillment of its military doctrine and compliance with the UN Charter and generally recognized norms and principles of international law. The Russian Federation affirms the strictly defensive direction of its activities for ensuring military security; its fundamental adherence to goals of preventing wars and armed conflicts and eliminating them from the life of mankind, of comprehensive disarmament, and of eliminating military blocs; and its resolve to achieve the creation of regional systems and a global system of general and comprehensive security and the formation of a balanced, equitable, multipolar world. [END]
  • RED ARMY

    1917 - Red Guard leads by Leo Trotsky ("krasnogvardeitsy").

    Lenin

    Trotsky, the founder of Red Army

    Ulianov (Lenin). A head of Soviet Government.

    Leo Trotsky, the Founder of the Red Guard, Red Army.

    The Order for Red Army creation (Decree of the "Soviet People Commissars"). Signed by Lenin January 15 (28 old style) 1918 y.

    Red Army

    Red Army

    Stamped 22st January 1918 year.

    Signed by Lenin

    The Military Parade magazine (published in Russian and English)

    The Military Parade magazine (published in Russian and English) was founded in 1994. It focuses on the demonstration of Russia’s military-technical potential, promotion of Russian-made armament and military equipment on international arms markets, rendering help in attracting investments, increasing the number of international partners, and solving tasks of military-technical cooperation.

    Military Parade is a unique source of information on new weapon systems and military equipment, their combat use, state-of-the-art technologies, modern conversional products, tendencies of the international arms market development, military reforms and Russia’s military policy. The articles are mostly contributed by Russia’s prominent statesmen, military leaders and experts, renowned scientists, designers, heads of design bureaus and research institutes.

    The magazine is distributed by subscription, wholesale and retail sales, at international exhibitions, via international agencies and Internet, and via targeted circulation. It is intended for governmental structures, military, business and industry circles of over 80 countries worldwide, as well as for all those interested in armament and military issues.

    Our constant customers and partners include governmental agencies, exporters of special-purpose products, Russia’s leading design bureaus, research institutes, enterprises engaged in the production of armament, military equipment and their components, as well as a number of Russian banks and insurance companies.

    The Military Parade magazine participates in all largest international defense exhibitions and prepares dedicated insertions and materials highlighting Russia’s participation in such shows.

    We also publish special issues for defense enterprises based in various regions of Russia and the CIS, as well as issues timed to our state’s history milestones and to jubilees of renowned persons of our defense industrial complex.

    The Soviet Army

    The Soviet Army (Soviet Army) - www.ihfhilm.compad

    The Soviet Army
    (Soviet Army)


    The Soviets' own presentation of their modern military preparations for war. See the Soviet infantry overcome flaming obstacle courses, fight tanks with mines and rockets, and practice ground, underwater, and night attacks. See the Soviet Air Force and Baltic fleet in combat exercises. USSR, 1974, B&W/Color, 60 minutes. Two films on one videocassette.

    Russian

    Experts said that Russia could become the most important partner of the French defense industry outside Europe, and that both countries could jointly develop new weapons.

    A Russian defense ministry official told respected business daily Vedomosti that Francois Lureau, director general of the French Defense Procurement Agency, had visited Moscow for the first time and held talks with General Yury Baluyevsky, head of the Russian General Staff, and defense industry representatives.

    The French defense industry stands to gain about $1 billion from cooperation with Russia. French avionics systems account for 15% of the price of the Sukhoi Su-30 MKM Flanker fighters, worth $950 million, bought by Malaysia and for 10% of the $1.5-billion price tag of the Su-30 MKAs to be delivered to Algeria.

    A source close to the talks said that the Russian military and Lureau had agreed to install the French systems on Su-30 MKA fighters designated for Algeria under a bilateral arms deal that was signed in early March.

    A defense ministry official said France also wanted to jointly develop unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), while Russia was patterning its state defense order after the French weapons procurement system. In March, Deputy Prime Minister Sergei Ivanov, who is also Russia's defense minister, announced plans to establish a state weapons procurement agency by early 2007 and said its functions would resemble those of the French Defense Procurement Agency.

    Konstantin Makiyenko, deputy director of the Center for Analysis, Strategy and Technology, said Moscow considered Paris its main partner in the sphere of high-tech machine engineering. "France understands that Russia is Europe's natural strategic reserve, if the EU wants to remain a global market player," Makiyenko said.
    Ivan Safranchuk, director of the Moscow office of the Center for Defense Information, said French-Russian military and technical cooperation was facilitated by competition against the United States on foreign markets. "Both countries may even develop new weapons," he said.

    vojislav koštunica-srpski premijer